The essence of statecraft for a middle category country located in a challenging geopolitical environment lies in maximising its options and yet for much of its history, Pakistan has depended disproportionately on the United States. True to the logic of unequal relationships, Washington has always sought to curtail Pakistan's room for manoeuvre to ensure better compliance with its own regional project. The hapless junior partner has often struggled to enlarge its options in the face of suspension of military supplies, sanctions, coercive diplomacy, and interference in its internal affairs.
This is a chequered narrative with the graph of compellence and compliance fluctuating notably. Pakistan declined to join the Korean War and the war on the people of Vietnam. During the India-China border conflict of 1962, Ayub Khan complied with the American wish that he would not create any problem for India in Kashmir. Subsequently, Pakistan defied Washington and established close relations with China. It fended off a more severe American campaign against its nuclear programme.
In 1998 Nawaz Sharif resisted blandishments and threats from Clinton and carried out nuclear tests. Pakistan played a substantial role in rolling back the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. In 2001, General Musharraf's response exceeded Colin Powell's wildest expectations. This decision changed the course of Pakistan's history as it gave the United States ingress into Pakistan that the post-Musharraf political government greatly widened, tempting Washington to micromanage Pakistan.
But then, where did the project go wrong? Principally, it got unravelled in Afghanistan. Insofar as factors intrinsic to Pakistan are concerned, consider the mutual disappointment. There is a crisis of exaggerated expectations destined to remain unfulfilled. Washington did not spend its money wisely in Pakistan; years rolled by without Pakistan getting market access in the United States. The deepening economic malaise easily translated into a national rejection of "America's war" in the region; President Zardari now puts the Pakistani losses in it at $100 billion.
Consider also how Washington over-estimated the extent to which it could push the Pakistani armed forces. It failed to appreciate that under General Kayani the army has emerged as
the main custodian of Pakistani nationalism. Pakistan's military was alienated by policies that jeopardise its perceived national mission.
The discriminatory Indo-US nuclear deal was seen to eventually degrade Pakistan's nuclear deterrence. Washington was also perceived to be impatient to break into the lucrative arms market of India while treating the Pakistan army as a counter- insurgency force. Then, the United States remained insensitive to Pakistan's concerns about a future dispensation in Afghanistan. Campaigns of vilification to break the will of the Pakistani army and intelligence services made things worse. The military was left with no option but to dig in and rally the people around issues of national security.
Where does the All Parties Conference (APC) fit in? It issued a bland declaration while hiding behind the earlier parliamentary resolutions to re-visit foreign policy. The decision-making echelon of the ruling elite was unable to resist this reiteration but remains as indifferent as ever to the task of implementing the earlier prescriptions; it is not even persuaded that it would be the right course for Pakistan. Even if it was, it has never worked properly on contingency plans to offset American reprisals particularly in the economic field.
The ruling coalition has not even grasped the possibility that the United States may, in any case, decide to reduce its engagement with Pakistan. The committee tasked with giving substance to the APC's generalities can succeed only if the prime minister mobilises the entire government to formulate alternatives to an excessive dependence on the United States.
Tanvir Ahmad Khan, News International (Rawalpindi), October 5, 2011, http://www.thenews.com.pk/TodaysPrintDetail.aspx?ID=70984&Cat=9&dt=10/5/2011
0 comments:
Post a Comment