Hillary Clinton's visit did not achieve much. Apart from the usual warnings and threats, US Secretary of State Clinton appears to have had little to offer. When challenged, she turned from intimidation to conciliation. It is not clear if there was any real agreement on anything significant, and if so on what. What was clear was that neither side thought much of the other's policies. Unfortunately, both are correct in this regard. Each has followed dysfunctional policies: the US towards Afghanistan, the surrounding region and the Muslim world in general; and Pakistan with regard to governing itself and implementing policies based on the priorities of its people instead of the interests of its elite.
The simple truth is that no government in Pakistan can find legitimacy in supporting the destabilising and violent policies of the US war on terror in Afghanistan and the western border regions of Pakistan. The US invasion of Afghanistan was as much a violation of international law as its invasion of Iraq.
Neither had the prior support of a specifically authorising resolution of the UN Security Council. Moreover, US security policies stem from doctrines that are themselves violations of the UN Charter. They do not provide a basis for international peace and stability. In Afghanistan alone the US has killed, injured, displaced, traumatised,
humiliated and destroyed the homes and livelihoods of countless numbers of people. Much as it had in Iraq and threatens to do elsewhere. The spillover of US policy in Afghanistan has seriously destabilised Pakistan. The US is now proclaiming its determination to relentlessly continue its policies in Afghanistan well beyond 2014. Its "refusal to abandon Afghanistan" could well seal the fate of that hapless country. The human and economic costs of this hi-tech barbarity are already incalculable and unforgiveable. In the name of combating terror it has spawned terror on a much larger scale even if it has protected its homeland. The irony is that Americans are individually such fine and generous people.
How can we even pretend to share broad agreement with US policy on Afghanistan? US policy in Afghanistan is part of its regional strategy which is aimed at isolating Iran in order to eventually undermine its regime, the containment of an emerging China which is the only country with which Pakistan has a genuine strategic relationship, and control over access routes to the resources of Central Asia. Hence its determination to sign a long-term security arrangement with Afghanistan which would provide it "access to facilities," a euphemism for enduring military bases. How will this ever promote reconciliation and stability in Afghanistan and the region? It requires a compliant regime in Kabul since no free and independent Afghan government would ever agree to it.
The US has just failed to persuade Iraq to conclude such a deal because it insisted on immunity for US military personnel from any prosecution under Iraqi law. Does the US expect a "stable, peaceful, and friendly" Afghanistan to be less independent and sovereign than Iraq? American policies are now placing this same question before the people of Pakistan.
Pakistan, of course, has to undertake the massive task of putting its own house in order for it to be taken seriously by the international community. But it cannot achieve any of this as a so-called ally in the US war on terror. That would undermine the legitimacy of the whole effort. The US war on terror in Afghanistan has helped to bring about the current situation in Fata, in Quetta, in Karachi, and through the inflammation of national and religious sentiment, increasingly in the rest of the country. If Pakistan's standing in the international community is at its lowest ever today its ruling elites are primarily responsible for this state of affairs. But US policies have been a major contributing factor and remain a significant impediment to stemming the rot, and reversing course. The essential condition for emerging from the national impasse we find ourselves in is to prioritise the needs of our people over any domestic elite or foreign strategic interests. Our US-dependent elite classes, by definition, will refuse to do any of this.
This is not to deny that we have a vital interest in developing a decent, mutually satisfactory and predictable relationship with a country as important as the US is for Pakistan. But we need to forego the vain pursuit of a strategic relationship with it which is neither feasible nor desirable. We do not share strategic objectives in Afghanistan or the region. The US cannot have strategic relations with both India and
Pakistan while the two neighbours remain locked in a largely zero-sum relationship. The US will always choose India as a strategic partner over Pakistan. Once these realities and their implications are acknowledged we can begin to build a healthy and significant non-strategic relationship with the US. The obstacles here are the current strategic policies of both countries. They need to be rationalised.
With regard to Afghanistan, we cannot presume to be the protector of one Afghan community against other Afghan communities no matter how many links we share with it. We must earn the trust and confidence of all Afghan communities if we are to contribute towards a stable Afghanistan that sees its national interests in developing wide-ranging cooperation with Pakistan. US support for an Indian role in an Afghanistan settlement should not bother us as long as we play our cards sensibly and do not try to punch above our weight. That would only alienate Afghan, including Pashtun, goodwill and minimise our role in promoting Afghan peace and stability. Our natural geopolitical levers should enable us to neutralise any hostile Indian policies in Afghanistan towards us provided our own policies make good sense to the Afghans. Trying to limit Afghan options would be just another form of the ridiculous "strategic depth" policy that reflects our "India-centric" focus.
So where do we go from here? There are six fundamental parties to an Afghan settlement. Three internal and three external. The Karzai-led government in Kabul, the Taliban-led resistance, and Afghan civil society are the three internal Afghan parties. Pakistan, the US and Iran are the primary external parties. It is for the Afghan parties to set the parameters of a settlement process and to determine a settlement outcome. It is for the external parties to support the collective efforts of the Afghan parties without interfering or backing specific Afghan parties. US "redlines" are as irrelevant and unacceptable, as those of any other external party.
The Afghan parties (question: who will represent Afghan civil society and can they find common ground among themselves?) must make compatible and credible commitments including statements in favour of a negotiated peace settlement, an overall ceasefire, a timetable for the withdrawal of foreign troops, steps to avoid a civil war including efforts – without use of force – to settle internal differences, acceptance of international humanitarian and human rights laws within a Shariah context, a mechanism (a revamped High Peace Council?) and a location (preferably within Afghanistan) for extended but time-bound discussions on the above issues. This effort must commence immediately. Back channelling between the Afghan parties should start straight away to set the process in motion. The UN appears too discredited to play a facilitating role. But there may be no better alternative available. Pakistan should have been able to do it.
Pakistan, Iran and the US need to coordinate their support of such an Afghan process. US policies towards Iran are a hindrance. But if the US truly seeks peace and stability in Afghanistan it cannot veto an Iranian role. The forthcoming Istanbul and Bonn conferences will not achieve anything if there is no internal Afghan process underway. Conflating the internal and external parties at this stage while excluding the Taliban and Afghan civil society can only create confusion. It will just continue the criminal search for military solutions posing as preparations for an Afghan peace process. Pakistan should not be part of it.
Progressively the international community including the European Union, India, etc should join in supporting the settlement process especially with regard to
reconstruction, rehabilitation, refugee return, capacity building and DDR (disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration) programmes. A peace process will be many sided and extended. It will require conceptual consensus and clarity, and its first steps can and must be taken without delay.
Ashraf Jehangir Qazi, News International (Rawalpindi), October 25, 2011, http://www.thenews.com.pk/TodaysPrintDetail.aspx?ID=74506&Cat=9&dt=10/25/2011
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